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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Gabriel Torres appeals from the judgment of conviction and sentence 
entered upon the jury verdict finding him guilty of possession of a dangerous 
weapon by an inmate, and from the sentence imposed upon his conviction for 
aggravated assault. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
Torres was an inmate at the Canyon County jail. (Trial Tr., p.138, Ls.16-
21; p.139, Ls.15-18.) In May 2011, a Canyon County Sheriff's Officer conducted 
a routine search of Torres' cell. (Trial Tr., p.139, Ls.5-18.) The search revealed a 
modified spork hidden inside of a large envelope that contained Torres' legal 
paperwork. (Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.3-22; p.149, Ls.8-13.) The spoon portion of the 
spark had been cut off and the remaining handle was "sharpened to a point." 
(Trial Tr., p.141, Ls.3-6; p.144, Ls.5-11.) The officer confiscated the modified 
spark and confronted Torres about it. (Trial Tr., p.142, Ls.6-11; p.146, Ls.19-22.) 
Torres claimed that he found the spork. (Trial Tr., p.147, Ls.13-18.) 
A grand jury indicted Torres with possession of a dangerous weapon by an 
inmate, I.C. § 18-2511. 1 (R., Vol. I, pp.8-9.) Following a trial, the jury found 
Torres guilty of that charge. (R., Vol. I, p.155; see generally Trial Tr.) 
Approximately one week after the verdict on the weapon charge was 
entered, and prior to sentencing on that charge, Torres was involved in a_n 
incident at the jail in which he and five other inmates confronted and attacked 
another inmate in a bathroom. (R., Vol. II, pp.198-199; Sentencing exhibit 1, 
1 Idaho Code§ 18-2511 has since been repealed and replaced by I.C. § 18-2510. 
1 
I 
I 
Ii 
• I.C·l) ~, 
i 
I . . 
Ill 
• 
I'! . . 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
pp. 7-11.) Much of the attack was captured on video. (Sentencing exhibit 1, 
pp.10-11.) The victim sustained injuries consistent with being struck, including 
red abrasions on his forehead, cheeks, and the top and back of his head. 
(Sentencing exhibit 1, p.7.) Torres and the other attackers had gang affiliations . 
(R., Vol. II, p.198.) A grand jury indicted Torres for rioting, I.C. § 18-6401, 18-
6402, and the Gang Enforcement Act sentencing enhancement, I.C. § 18-
8503(1 )(b). (R., Vol. II, pp.209-212.) 
Pursuant to a plea agreement, Torres pied guilty to an amended charge of 
aggravated assault. (R., Vol. II, pp.234-253.) The state agreed to dismiss the 
Gang Enforcement Act sentencing enhancement, and to recommend that Torres' 
aggravated assault sentence be run concurrently with his sentence for 
possession of a dangerous weapon by an inmate. (Id.) 
The district court held a consolidated sentencing hearing on the two 
charges. (6/27 /12 Tr.) The court imposed a unified sentence of five years, with 
one and one-half years fixed for possession of a dangerous weapon by an 
inmate, and a concurrent unified sentence of five years, with two and one-half 
years fixed for aggravated assault. (R., Vol. II, pp.176-177, 275-276.) 
Torres filed timely notices of appeal in both cases. (R., Vol. II, pp.178-180, 
278-280.) The Idaho Supreme Court granted Torres' motion to consolidate the 
cases for appeal. (8/29/12 Order.) 
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ISSUES 
Torres states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the district court err by incorrectly instructing the jury on 
the elements of possession of a dangerous weapon? 
2. Did the district court abuse its discretion when it imposed an 
aggregate sentence of five years, with two and one-half 
years fixed, upon Mr. Torres following his plea of guilty to 
one count of aggravated assault and his conviction for one 
count of possession of a dangerous weapon? 
(Appellant's brief, p.9) 
1. 
2. 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
Has Torres failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions? 
Has Torres failed to show that the district court abused its sentencing 
discretion? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Torres Has Failed To Show Fundamental Error In The Jury Instructions 
Introduction 
For the first time on appeal, Torres argues that the district court erred by 
failing to properly instruct the jury during his trial on the charge of possession of a 
dangerous weapon by an inmate. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-11.) Specifically, Torres 
contends that the jury instructions omitted an essential element of the crime, and 
relieved the state of its burden of proving that the spork found in his possession 
was a "dangerous weapon." (Id.) However, a review of the relevant instruction 
reveals that Torres has failed to show error, let alone fundamental error that 
would necessitate reversal of his conviction. 
B. Standard Of Review 
Whether a jury was properly instructed is a question of law over which the 
appellate court exercises free review. State v. Draper, 151 Idaho 576, 587, 261 
P.3d 853, 864-65 (2011); State v. Pina, 149 Idaho 140, 147, 233 P.3d 71, 78 
(2010). When reviewing jury instructions, this Court determines whether the 
instructions as a whole, and not individually, fairly and accurately reflect 
applicable law. State v. Bowman, 124 Idaho 936, 942 (Ct. App. 1993). "An 
erroneous instruction will not constitute reversible error unless the instructions as 
a whole misled the jury or prejudiced a party." Draper, 151 Idaho at 588, 261 
P.3d at 865 (quoting State v. Shackelford, 150 Idaho 355, 373-74, 247 P.3d 582, 
600-01 (2010)). 
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C. Torres Has Failed To Carry His Burden Of Establishing Fundamental Error 
With Respect To His Claim Of Instructional Error 
"It is a fundamental tenet of appellate law that a proper and timely 
objection must be made in the trial court before an issue is preserved for appeal." 
State v. Carlson, 134 Idaho 389, 398, 3 P.3d 67, 76 (Ct. App. 2000). This same 
principle applies to alleged errors in jury instructions. See I.C.R. 30(b) ("No party 
may assign as error the giving of or failure to give an instruction unless the party 
objects thereto before the jury retires to consider its verdict, stating distinctly the 
instruction to which the party objects and the grounds of the objection."). Absent 
a timely objection, the appellate courts of this state will only review an alleged 
error under the fundamental error doctrine. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227, 
245 P.3d 961, 979 (2010). 
Review under the fundamental error doctrine requires Torres to 
demonstrate the error he alleges: "(1) violates one or more of [hisJ unwaived 
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any additional 
information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to 
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision); and (3) was not harmless." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Application of this three-prong test to 
Torres' claim of instructional error shows that he has failed to demonstrate 
fundamental .error. 
Idaho Code § 18-2511 provided: "Any inmate of a penal institution or jail 
who shall manufacture, deliver or possess a controlled substance or a dangerous 
weapon is guilty of a felony." In this case, Torres was charged with possession of 
a dangerous weapon by an inmate. (R., Vol. I, pp.8-9). Jury instruction #12 read, 
in relevant part: 
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In order for the defendant to be guilty of Possession of a 
Dangerous Weapon by an Inmate, the state must prove each of the 
following: 
(R., Vol. I, p.146.) 
1. On or about May 10, 2011 
2. in the state of Idaho 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6 . 
7. 
the defendant Gabriel Torres 
while an inmate 
of a [sic] the Canyon County Jail 
did posses 
a dangerous weapon, to wit: a sharpened 
plastic eating utensil. 
Torres concedes he did not object to this instruction at trial, but argues he 
is entitled to relief under the fundamental error doctrine. (Appellant's brief, pp.6-
11.) Specifically, Torres contends instruction #12 violated his due process rights 
because it constituted a "conclusive instruction" which informed the jury that a 
sharpened plastic eating utensil, was, in fact, a "dangerous weapon." (Id.) 
Therefore, Torres asserts, the jury could have reasonably concluded that the 
instruction directed it to find him guilty of possession of a dangerous weapon if it 
found that he possessed a sharpened plastic easting utensil. (Id.) Torres, 
however, has failed to show any error, much less fundamental error that would 
entitle him to relief. 
The first prong of the fundamental error test requires Torres to 
demonstrate a constitutional violation. Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. 
Torres has failed to show that his constitutional rights were violated because the 
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instructions, as a whole, did not misstate the law or permit the jury to convict 
Torres for legal conduct. 
Instruction #12 utilized by the district court in this case is substantially 
similar to pattern jury instruction ICJI 605,2 which provides, in relevant part, that 
the state be required to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant 
possessed: "7. a dangerous weapon (specify)." Pattern instructions are 
presumptively correct. See State v. Reid, 151 Idaho 80, 85, 253 P.3d 754, 759 
(Ct. App. 2011) (citations omitted). 
Instruction #12, as directed by I.C. § 18-2511 and as guided by ICJI 605, 
expressly required the jury to determine whether the state proved beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Torres possessed a dangerous weapon. The instruction 
then went on to specify exactly what type of weapon Torres was alleged to have 
possessed. The instruction did not literally or expressly define "a sharpened 
plastic eating utensil" to be a "dangerous weapon" on its face. Therefore, despite 
Torres' assertion to the contrary, Instruction #12, line 7, did not relieve the state of 
its obligation to prove any of the elements of the charged offense; it instead 
merely informed the jury as to the type of object the state claimed constituted a 
"dangerous weapon." 
Read in its totality, the challenged jury instruction correctly instructed the 
jury. The instruction did not omit any of the crime's essential elements, nor did it 
relieve the state of its duty to prove those elements beyond a reasonable doubt 
or permit it to convict Torres for legal conduct. Torres has therefore failed to meet 
2 While ICJI 1206 provides a pattern jury instruction regarding the definition of 
"deadly weapon," there is no corresponding pattern instruction defining a 
"dangerous weapon." 
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her burden to show constitutional error, and has failed to satisfy the first prong of 
the Perry fundamental error analysis. 
The second element of a claim of fundamental error is that the alleged 
error is "clear or obvious, without the need for any additional information not 
contained in the appellate record, including information as to whether the failure 
to object was a tactical decision." Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978 
(footnote omitted). The third element of a claim of fundamental error requires 
Torres to "demonstrate that the error affected his substantial rights, meaning (in 
most instances) that it must have affected the outcome of the trial proceedings." 
Perry, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at 978. Torres cannot satisfy either of these 
prongs for similar reasons. He cannot show clear error because he cannot show 
any reasonable probability that the jury actually read instruction #12 as 
affirmatively informing it that the spark was, in fact, a "dangerous weapon." He 
also cannot show that any error or ambiguity in instruction #12 affected the 
outcome of the trial proceedings, because he cannot show that the jury declined 
to determine whether the state proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the spark 
was a "dangerous weapon." 
The issue of whether the spark was a "dangerous weapon" was not only a 
contested issue that both parties specifically argued to the jury during closing 
argument, but it was the only disputed issue at trial. Under these circumstances, 
there is no reasonable probability that the jury disregarded these arguments and 
instead simply read instruction #12 as directing them to determine the sole 
. 
contested issue in favor of the state. 
8 
I ' 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
I 
Only one witnesses testified at trial. Canyon County Sheriff's Officer 
Daniel Combs testified that he searched Torres' jail cell and found the modified 
spork. (Trial Tr., p.137, L.8 - p.156, L.20.) Officer Combs described the 
modifications made to the spark, and expressed his concerns about the potential 
danger the object posed to the inmates and staff of the facility. (Id.) 
During her closing argument, the prosecutor made clear that the state was 
required to prove that the spark was a dangerous weapon, and that this was the 
only truly disputed issue for the jury's determination: 
You also heard from Deputy Combs that [the spark] was 
modified from something like this. There is no question that it had 
been modified. There is no question that it was in the defendant's 
cell, that it was in an envelope in his cell containing his paperwork, 
that when Deputy Combs asked him about it he said he found it. 
So possession isn't an issue. That he was an inmate wasn't an 
issue. The only issue for you to consider today is whether or not 
you find that this is, in fact, is a dangerous weapon. 
Ladies and gentlemen, the state would argue to you that this 
is a dangerous weapon. That in the hands of an inmate it can be 
used to cause serious injury or harm to another inmate, to jail staff. 
It can be used in a number of ways, a number of points on the body 
to cause harm. And because it can be used in such a way as to 
cause harm, it is therefore a dangerous weapon. 
(Trial Tr., p.169, Ls.15-25; p.170, Ls.5-12 (emphasis added).) 
In her rebuttal argument, the prosecutor reiterated the state's burden to 
prove that the spork was a "dangerous weapon": 
The only thing I have to prove to you is that [Torres] was an 
inmate, he possessed [the spark], he had it in his jail cell, hidden in 
an envelope in his jail cell, and that this is a dangerous weapon. 
(Trial Tr., p.176, Ls.22-25.) 
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Torres' counsel did not contest Torres' status as an inmate, or the fact that 
Torres possessed the spark, but instead utilized his entire closing argument to 
assert that the spark did not constitute a "dangerous weapon." (Trial Tr., p.171, 
L.11 - p.175, L.25.) 
Torres cannot show clear error, or prejudice from any error, because he 
cannot show that the jury declined to consider what was presented by both 
parties as the sole disputed issue at trial - whether the spork constituted a 
"dangerous weapon." Torres has therefore failed to satisfy either the second or 
third prongs of U1e Perry fundamental error test. 
Torres has failed to show fundamental error in the jury instructions and, as 
such, has failed to show any basis for reversal of his conviction. 
11. 
Torres Has Failed To Show The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion 
A. Introduction 
Tomes contends that the district court abused its discretion when it 
imposed concurrent unified five-year sentences with one and one-half and two 
and one-half years fixed, respectively, for possession of a dangerous weapon by 
an inmate and aggravated assault. (Appellant's brief, pp.11-16.) A review of the 
record reveals that Torres has failed to establish an abuse of discretion 
considering the objectives of sentencing, the nature of his crimes, his criminal 
history, and his demonstrated lack of ability to conform his behaviors to the rules 
and regulations of either probation or jail. 
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B. Standard Of Review 
When a sentence is within statutory limits, the appellate court will review 
only for an abuse of discretion. State v. Farwell, 144 Idaho 732, 736, 170 P.3d 
397, 401 (2007). 
C. The District Court Acted Well Within Its Sentencing Discretion 
To successfully bear the burden of demonstrating an abuse of sentencing 
discretion, the appellant must establish that, under any reasonable view of the 
facts, the sentence is excessive. Farwell, 144 Idaho at 736, 170 P.3d at 401. To 
establish that the sentence is excessive, Torres must demonstrate that 
reasonable minds could not conclude the sentence is appropriate to accomplish 
the sentencing goals of protecting society, deterrence, rehabilitation, and 
retribution. Id. Idaho appellate courts presume that the fixed portion of a 
sentence will be the defendant's probable term of confinement. State v. Trevino, 
132 Idaho 888, 980 P.2d 552 (1999). 
In this case, the district court considered the appropriate sentencing 
factors, and the Idaho statutory provision requiring courts to consider the 
possibility of probation. (6/27/12 Tr., p.133, Ls.9-25.) The court reviewed the 
presentence investigation report, and continued the sentencing hearing by one 
day to ensure that it had adequately reviewed materials submitted by the parties. 
(6/26/12Tr; 6/27/12Tr., p.133, L.25-p.134, L.3.) 
While the charges in the present case constituted his first two felony 
convictions, Torres has an extensive misdemeanor criminal record. (See PSI, 
pp.2-7.) Torres has at least fifteen misdemeanor convictions for crimes including 
possession of marijuana, carrying a concealed weapon, destruction of evidence, 
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violation of a no-contact order, battery, obstructing or delaying a peace officer, 
domestic battery, and destruction of a telecommunications line. (Id.) 
Further, contrary to Torres' assertions on appeal championing his 
"rehabilitative potential," the record reflects that Torres has consistently 
demonstrated an inability to comply with the rules of either probation or jail, and 
is thus not a viable candidate for community supervision. Torres has at least 
three prior probation violations. (Id.) At the time of his commission of the instant 
offenses, Torres was in custody topping out his sentence for a misdemeanor 
charge because he was "tired" of doing probation. (PSI, p.7.) Torres' most 
recent probation officer described him as being "completely non-compliant" with 
probation. (Id.) Prior to and following Torres' conduct which led to his 
convictions in this case, he was frequently disciplined by jail personnel for 
various violations of jail rules. (Sentencing exhibit 2, pp.115-121.) 
Torres has failed to establish an abuse of the district court's sentencing 
discretion. He is therefore not entitled to relief. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Torres' judgment of 
conviction and sentences. 
DATED this 21st day of November, 2013. 
MARKWOlSON ~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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